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Abstract
This paper empirically analyses how the adoption of Information Technologies (IT) has
changed the organization of global supply chains. We focus on international mergers,
which are a growing and important component of foreign direct investment. We use data
on North–South mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We show that the effect of IT adoption
on the number of vertical M&As is decreasing with the routine intensity of the industry. Our
interpretation is that the IT revolution enabled new monitoring mechanisms. This allowed
Northern headquarters to better monitor suppliers, especially those in less routine-intensive
industries –which were harder to monitor before.
I. Introduction
The Information Technologies (IT) revolution has changed the organization of the ﬁrm.1 It
has been argued that IT have allowed headquarters to better monitor suppliers, as the next
quote from the New York Times (19 March 2011) illustrates.
“… supply lines are longer and far more complex than in the past. The ability to manage
these complex networks, experts say, has become possible because of technology – Internet
communications, RFID tags and sensors attached to valued parts, and sophisticated software
for tracking and orchestrating the ﬂow of goods worldwide.”
This paper provides a ﬁrst attempt to empirically study how the adoption of these IT
has affected the international organization of the supply chain of Northern ﬁrms. We focus
on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), which are an important and growing fraction of
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See, for example, Bloom et al. (2014) for an empirical analysis of the impact of ICT technologies on the
organization of Northern ﬁrms. The fall in communication costs has also expanded the range of jobs that are being
offshored. See, among others, Blinder (2006), Crino` (2010), Ebenstein et al. (2014) and Oldenski (2011).
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foreign direct investment (FDI).2 More broadly, the paper contributes to the analysis of
the effect of IT on the organization of the ﬁrm, by exploiting international variation in IT
adoption.
The starting premise of our paper is that contractual frictions play an important role in
the organization of global supply chains. This is a well documented fact in the international
trade literature.3 We focus on monitoring problems as the source of contractual frictions.
In line with our emphasis on monitoring, the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2013)
identiﬁes communication and information ﬂows, which allow better monitoring and coor-
dination, as key elements for effective governance of global supply chains.
To investigate how the IT revolution has affected M&As, we develop a task-based
model of organizational choice of upstream production with agency problems. Tasks differ
on how closely they follow tight and standardized procedures. Standardized tasks are easier
to monitor. We assume that the IT revolution reduces the monitoring costs in an industry by
expanding the set of tasks that can be easily monitored. This is consistent with the ﬁndings
of Baker and Hubbard (2003) for the trucking industry, Bloom et al. (2013) for a survey
of US manufacturing plants and the growing international trade literature highlighting the
importance of IT in facilitating a ﬁner ‘slicing’ of the global supply chain. Following the
international trade literature, we consider that the level of IT infrastructure is a country
characteristic and, thus, exogenous to ﬁrms’ choice.4
The expansion in monitorable tasks generated by the IT revolution causes a relatively
higher fall in monitoring costs of previously harder-to-monitor industries. This delivers the
most salient prediction of our model: harder-to-monitor industries receive relatively more
M&As with the IT revolution.The testable implication of this complementarity result is that
countries abundant in IT infrastructure receive relatively more M&As in harder-to-monitor
industries.5
To give empirical content to the notion of hard-to-monitor industries, we use the routine
task index developed by Autor and Dorn (2009). An industry is deﬁned as routine-intensive
when the average task performed in that industry requires relatively tight and standard-
ized procedures. Accordingly, we argue that it is more difﬁcult to monitor production in
industries with less standardized tasks.
We focus our empirical analysis on vertical North–South M&As within the manufac-
turing sector. The reason is that, as emphasized, among others, in Antra`s (2003) and Antra`s,
Desai and Foley (2009), agency problems are more severe when a supplier is located in the
2
According to UNCTAD (2000), Table I.1, the ratio of the value of global cross-border M&As to the value of
global FDI is about 80%. Moreover, the value of completed cross-border M&As rose from less than $100 billion in
1987 (which represented 72% of the total value of FDI inﬂows) to $720 billion in 1999 (which represented 83% of
the total value of FDI inﬂows).
3
See Antra`s (2014) for a survey of theoretical and empirical papers emphasizing the role of contractual frictions
on the international organization of production.
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See, for example, Baldwin (2012), Basco and Mestieri (2013) and Antra`s and Chor (2013).
5
Our model considers two organizational forms: M&A and ‘O-organtization’. O-organizations embed the better
alternative to mergers between arm’s length contracting and greenﬁeld investments. We choose this simple classiﬁ-
cation to emphasize that our focus and results (both theoretical and empirical) are on the effects of IT on mergers
across industries. It would be interesting to study also the effects of IT on the choice across different organizational
forms (e.g. greenﬁeld vs. M&As). Unfortunately, comparable comprehensive cross-country data of the type, we use
for mergers are not available for other organizational modes.
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South, while they are much less important in the North.6 We obtain data on mergers from
SDC Thomson Platinum, which is the most comprehensive data set publicly available. A
merger is classiﬁed as vertical if (i) the 4-digit SIC codes of the target and acquirer ﬁrms
are different and (ii) the output of the SIC code of the target ﬁrm is an input used to pro-
duce the output of the SIC code of the acquirer. We use the 1997 direct requirements U.S.
Input–Output table to perform this exercise.7 Our variable of interest is the number of ver-
tical M&As by country and industry in the 1990s. We study the 1990s because the pattern
of North–South trade dramatically changed in those years. As argued in Baldwin (2006),
Blinder (2006) and Basco and Mestieri (2013), among others, the IT revolution was one of
the main drivers of this change.8 Lastly, our proxy for adoption of IT at the country level
is Internet users from WDI (World Bank), which is the most extensive Internet adoption
variable available for Southern countries.
Consistent with the complementarity implied by our model, we show that the effect of
the adoption of IT on the number of M&As is decreasing with the routine intensity of the
industry. Our interpretation is that, in Southern countries with low IT adoption, Northern
headquarters only ﬁnd optimal to acquire a ﬁrm in very routine-intensive industries, where
monitoring problems are of little importance. However, in Southern countries with more
IT adoption, Northern headquarters also ﬁnd optimal to merge in less routine-intensive
industries, because the adoption of IT reduces monitoring costs.
Quantitatively, we ﬁnd that if IT adoption in a Southern country raises from the 25th
to the 75th percentile of the distribution, ceteris paribus, the increase in the number of
mergers in a low routine-intensive industry (e.g. non-metallic products) would be 29%
higher than in a high routine-intensive industry (e.g. computer and electronics).
Given that our main result is on the interaction between IT infrastructure and the routine
intensity of an industry, we include both country and industry ﬁxed effects in our baseline
regression. We also include country-industry varying controls for exports, intraﬁrm exports
and capital inﬂows (FDI). The result also holds when we control for factor price differences
to account for Heckscher–Ohlin determinants of trade (Romalis, 2004).
A concern with our measure of IT infrastructure is that it could be a proxy for the wealth
or productivity of a country.To address this concern, we add the interaction between routine
intensity and aggregate productivity and the interaction with gross domestic product. Our
results are robust to the inclusion of these interactions.A similar concern is that our measure
of IT adoption is a proxy for institutions. We show that our results are robust to include the
interaction between routine intensity and property rights institutions and the interaction
with contracting institutions. Finally, we also show that our results hold when we control
for the interaction of IT infrastructure and skill intensity of the industry.9
6
Following the reasoning of focusing on Southern countries, we could look as well at South–South M&As.
However, we have a very low number of observations in our data for South–South M&As, which precludes their
analysis. A country is deﬁned as Southern if the GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) in 2000 is lower than the 50% of the
United States. Romalis (2004) uses the same deﬁnition.
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This deﬁnition is similar to Alfaro and Charlton (2009), Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2014) and Ramondo,
Rappoport and Ruhl (2012).
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We emphasize the effect of the IT revolution on North–South trade. However, there exists evidence that Internet
adoption increased exports also in the North. See, for example, Freund and Weinhold (2004).
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Our results are also robust to alternative measures of routine intensity and IT adoption. First, we use ERP adoption
at industry level as a proxy for routine intensity. ERP software allows headquarters to better monitor production (Bloom
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Related literature. This paper is related to different strands of the literature. A vast
literature on organizational economics followed the seminal work of Williamson (1975)
on the nature of the ﬁrm. The make-or-buy decision has also been studied in the context
of multinational ﬁrms. For example, Antra`s (2003) and Antra`s and Helpman (2004, 2008)
use the incomplete contracts approach of Grossman and Hart (1986). In our model, the
rents of the supplier come from a moral hazard problem in the production of tasks.
In the empirical section, we use the routine intensity index of Autor and Dorn (2009),
which measures the tightness and standardization of the production process, as a proxy for
how hard-to-monitor an industry is. The closest paper to our work is Costinot, Oldenski and
Rauch (2011). They use the routine intensity of an industry as a proxy for contractibility
and show that intraﬁrm trade tends to be higher in less routine-intensive industries. One
difference is that they use the importance of problem solving as a measure of routine
intensity. In addition, we are interested in the effect on mergers.
A small but growing literature has studied the relationship between mergers and trade.
On the empirical side, for example, Breinlich (2008) studies the effects of NAFTA on
mergers and shows that there is no robust link between tariff reductions and the number of
cross-border M&As. On the theoretical side, Neary (2007) shows that trade liberalizations
can trigger international (horizontal) merger waves. More recently, Nocke and Yeaple
(2007, 2008) analyse the choice between mergers and greenﬁeld investment. However, they
do not study how this choice is affected by the IT revolution. In our model, parent ﬁrms
‘cherry pick’acquired ﬁrms to be the most productive within their industry. This behaviour
has been documented inArnold and Javorcik (2009) for Indonesia and Guadalupe, Kuzmina
and Thomas (2012) for Spain.10
Another related paper is Head and Ries (2008). By developing a control-based model
of FDI, they derive and test a gravity equation of FDI stocks. Although we also emphasize
monitoring problems as a determinant of FDI activities, the goal of our paper is different.
We study how the IT revolution affects the choice of Northern ﬁrm in engaging in M&As
activities and how this effect depends on the monitoring problems of the industry.Therefore,
the contribution to this literature is to link the adoption of IT with the relative beneﬁt of
acquiring a ﬁrm. By showing how IT adoption affects the incentives of engaging in M&As,
this paper complements other studies that emphasize country characteristics in shaping the
FDI mode (e.g. Javorcik, 2004).
Antra`s, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a, b) and Bloom et al. (2014) among others
study, both theoretically and empirically, the effects of reductions in communication costs
(IT revolution) on the internal organization of the ﬁrm. Bloom et al. (2013) suggest that
ﬁrms that have improved their management practices through performance monitoring,
targets and incentives have higher levels of investment in IT. Fort (2016) shows that com-
munication technologies usage is a predictor of production fragmentation and offshoring.
et al., 2014). We ﬁnd that the effect of IT adoption on the number of M&As is larger in those industries with lower
usage of ERP (i.e. more monitoring problems). Then, we use Internet penetration rates (Comin and Mestieri, 2010)
as an alternative measure of IT adoption. We show that our result holds when using this alternative measure of IT
adoption.
10
Since our model is static, we abstract from subsequent improvements in acquired ﬁrms as documented in Arnold
and Javorcik (2009) and Javorcik and Poelhekke (2016) among others.
4
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that studies how the IT revolution has
changed the incentives to engage in M&As.
The next section develops a model to guide the empirical section. Section III discusses
our data. Section IV presents the main empirical results and section V shows the robustness
checks. The concluding remarks are in section VI.
II. Theoretical framework
The goal of this section is to lay out a theoretical framework that guides our empirical
exercise. We develop a stylized model of organizational choice of upstream production.
The model provides a micro-foundation for monitoring costs and analyses how the number
of mergers is affected by industry characteristics and IT adoption.
We consider a North–South economy. There is one Northern country and c = 1,…,C
Southern countries. There are s = 1,…,S industries. A ﬁnal good producer (or headquar-
ters) wants to produce abroad a measure Ns 0 of differentiated input varieties within
each industry s. The ﬁnal good producer combines input varieties into a ﬁnal good. Input
production can be located in any country, while ﬁnal good production is located only in
the North.11
We are interested in analysing the organizational choice of a ﬁnal good producer. The
ﬁnal good producer can choose between two organizational modes X ∈ {M ,O}. It can
either acquire an existing intermediate supplier (M&A) denoted by M -organization, or it
can choose some other organizational form, denoted by O-organization. This alternative
organizational mode subsumes the best alternative between greenﬁeld investments and
arm’s length contracting. We choose this classiﬁcation to emphasize that our focus and
results are on mergers and acquisitions.
Production function. – Labour is the only factor of production. To produce an input, a
worker has to perform T complementary tasks in a given ﬁrm. Production is carried out
by assembling tasks in a Leontief fashion. Formally, a worker employed in ﬁrm j produces
a(j) mint∈T q(t), where a(j) denotes the labour productivity of ﬁrm j and q(t) takes the value
of 1 if task t is performed successfully and 0 otherwise.
Agency problems. When an agent performs a task t ∈T, he can either exert high (H )
effort at a cost e(c) or low (L) effort at no cost. We allow the effort cost e(c) to differ across
countries, c, to capture differences in human capital, institutional arrangements, etc. Effort
is not observable by the headquarters, while the output is observable.
Headquarters have access to a monitoring technology. This technology allows head-
quarters to detect when an agent exerts low effort with probability (c,X ), which varies
across countries, c, and organizational modes, X. Upon detection of shirking, a penalty
proportional to the effort cost e(c) can be imposed, 0    1.
The role of routine intensity. A central premise of the paper is that industries differ on
how veriﬁable their production is. Both in this model and in our empirical exercise, we
capture this idea by having heterogeneous tasks across industries.Tasks differ in how closely
11
We abstract from transportation costs. Our results hold if there exists an iceberg transportation cost  for shipping
to the North. To see that, re-scale the productivity measure a to a/ , and all the stated results hold for the re-scaled
productivity.
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they follow tight and standardized procedures.12 Tasks can either be ‘standardized,’ in the
sense that they follow tight and standardized procedures, or discretional. The difference
between standardized and discretional tasks is that it is easier to infer whether high effort
was exerted in standardized tasks than in discretional tasks.
For simplicity, in the main text, we assume that effort can be perfectly inferred from
observing output in standardized tasks, while this is not the case for discretional tasks.13 If
an agent exerts high effort in a discretional task, the probability of output being usable for
production is PH . If the agent exerts low effort, the probability is PL(< PH ). We assume
that agents and headquarters are risk neutral and normalize their outside option to zero.
We assume that it is optimal for the headquarters to induce high effort in all tasks.14
Appendix B shows that the payment offered to induce a worker to exert high effort is
e(c)(1 − (c,X ))/ (PH −PL). As workers are paid their outside option for standardized
tasks,15 a worker in an industry with D discretional tasks is paid
De(c)1−(c,X )
PH −PL . (1)
Note that the payment to a worker (1) is increasing in the number of discretional tasks D
and decreasing in the probability of detecting shirking, (c,X ).
As we discussed, a central premise of the paper is that industries differ on how veriﬁable
production is. To capture this idea, we denote by D = T − s the number of discretional
tasks performed in industry s. Motivated by the fact that the routine task index used in the
empirical section measures how closely a task follows tight and standardized procedures,
we label the industry index s as the routine intensity of the industry. Thus, equation (1)
means that payments to workers are decreasing in the routine intensity index s.




where R(s, c,X ) ≡ T−s
PT−sH
· 1−(c, X )PH−PL and wc ≡ e(c). We can interpret wc as the marginal cost
of effort and R(s, c,X ) as the mark-up paid by the headquarters to ensure high effort.16 In
other words, the ﬁnal good producer has to pay rents to ensure the supply of inputs. Note
that these rents are decreasing in the routine intensity index s.
Organizational choices. There is a technological difference between M- and O-
organizations. If the ﬁnal good producer decides to acquire an input supplier, it inher-
its the productivity of the acquired supplier. For each industry and country, we assume that
12
As it will become apparent in section III, this modelling choice is motivated to draw a connection with the routine
task intensity index (RTI), which measures how closely a task follows tight and standardized procedures.
13
In Appendix C of the working paper version Basco and Mestieri (2016), we relax the stark separation between
standardized and discretional tasks. We allow for tasks to differ in their probability of being caught shirking in a
continuous manner, (t, c, X ), rather than having only two levels. We show that our results hold in this generalized
set-up.
14
Appendix B derives a sufﬁcient condition for having high effort being always optimal. This boils down to the
difference PH −PL being larger than a threshold and the expected penalty not being arbitrarily large.
15
Appendix C in the working paper version, Basco and Mestieri (2016), departs from this zero-normalization and
presents a model in which each task is paid a positive amount to derive the same results as in the main text.
16
As long as e(c) > PH , R(s, c, X ) > 1.
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there is a mass one of potential suppliers with productivity a∼F(a), with a continuously
decreasing probability density function and support a∈ [a, a¯], a¯∞.17 If headquarters
engage in an O-organization, they can either use their in-house productivity, a(s,O) or they
can decide to inherit the productivity of the supplier. The former case can be interpreted as
a greenﬁeld investment. The latter can be thought of an arm’s length relationship in which
the productivity is inherited from the supplier contracted.18 Thus, the O-organization rep-
resents the best competing alternative to M&As.
Organization and location choice. – The expected production cost per unit of output in
industry s, country c and input j under organization X is
(s, c,X , j)≡ R(s, c,X )wc
ascj(X )
, (3)
where wc is the price of labour in country c and ascj(X ) is the productivity of the supplier
of the jth input. The ﬁnal good producer wants to minimize the production costs for each
intermediate input used in production. Note that the choice of the set of locations and orga-
nizational modes is independent of the amount demanded of each particular intermediate.
Hence, the location-organization choice problem can be solved independently from the
demand levels of each intermediate. Thus, we do not need to specify the demand for each
particular intermediate in each industry. The ﬁnal good producer chooses the country of















{m(s, c,O) + 1 − F(a(s, c,M ))},
m(s, c,O)0, a(s, c,M )0 ∀s∈S, c∈C,
(4)
where(s, c,X , j) is deﬁned in (3), j indexes intermediates used in production andm(s, c,O)
is the mass of intermediates in industry s and country c produced with an O-organization.
Finally, a(s, c,M ) denotes the productivity threshold of ﬁrms with an M -organization in
country c and industry s, so that 1 − F(a(s, c,M )) is the mass of intermediates produced
in country c and industry s under an M -organization. Therefore, the Northern ﬁrm chooses
for each country and industry, the mass of intermediates produced with an O-organization,
m(s, c,O), and the productivity threshold of ﬁrms with an M -organization, a(s, c,M ).
Two comments on the location-organizational choice problem (4). First, to characterize
the solution, it sufﬁces to specify two objects for each country c and industry s: (i) the
productivity threshold above which ﬁrms are acquired and (ii) the mass of intermediates
produced under an O-organization. These two thresholds pin down the total number of
intermediates in industry s produced in country c, m(s, c,O) + 1 − F(a(s, c,M )). Note
also that thresholds enter directly the objective function because they determine the range
17
This nests, amongst others, the Pareto and exponential distributions. Pareto distributions provide a good descrip-
tion of productivity distributions (e.g. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, 2011, for France).
18
In the case that productivity is inherited from the contracted supplier, the pool of potential suppliers coincides
with the pool of targets for a merger.
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of intermediates produced in country c and industry s.19 The second remark is that the
organizational choice problem (4) consists of s separate problems, one for each industry.
So, the problem could be speciﬁed separately for each industry s (and the outer integral in
s be dropped).
The solution to this problem is given by a threshold cost ¯(s) for each industry, such
that all intermediates in industry s are produced at a lower or equal cost. For example,
suppose that in industry s there are O-organizations in country 1, and mergers in countries
1 and 2, then
¯(s) = R(s, 1,O)w1
a(s,O)
= R(s, 1,M )w1
a(s, 1,M )
= R(s, 2,M )w2
a(s, 2,M )
. (5)
Before turning to the study of the IT revolution and its testable implications, note that
with the structure we have imposed on the role of routine intensity, we have already one
testable prediction. (All proofs are in Appendix B).
Proposition 1. Ceteris paribus, in each Southern country, the number of M&As is
increasing in the routine intensity of the industry.
This result is intuitive. It states that industries with higher routine indexes (low monitor-
ing costs) should have more mergers than industries with low routine indexes. This result
is a direct consequence from the assumption that more routine-intensive industries have to
incur lower monitoring costs because they have a lower share of discretional tasks. Thus, it
cannot be that in a given Southern country there are more mergers in a low routine-intensive
industry than in a high routine-intensive industry.
The IT revolution and testable implications
We frame the IT revolution as an improvement in the capabilities of the ﬁnal good pro-
ducer to monitor the production process of the supplier. For example, headquarters may
acquire more easily relevant information on the production process in real time. Thus, our
assumption is that the IT revolution reduces monitoring costs.
Assumption 1. Let ic denote the level of IT adoption in country c. The probability of
detecting shirking in country c and organizational choice X, (c,X ; ic), is increasing in ic.
That is, the monitoring technology becomes more efﬁcient as IT diffuses in country c.
Improvements in the monitoring technology translate into reductions in the rents paid
to suppliers. Formally, from equation (2) we see that rents paid under any organizational
19
The exact expressions are
∫ Ns
0










(s, c, M , j)1j∈{s,c,M }dj=
∫ ∞
a(s,c,M )
R(s, c, M )wc
a
f (a)da,
where the indicator function 1j∈{s,c,X } denotes whether the jth intermediate is produced under {s, c, X }, mˆ(·) denotes
the mass of ﬁrms set-up with in-house technology, as(O) and a(s, c, O) denotes the productivity level of the least
productive ﬁrm that has received an arm’s length contract.
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form R(s, c,X ; i) weakly decrease with i.20 Note that in our exercise we take the level of
IT as a country characteristic and, thus, exogenous to ﬁrms’ choice. This assumption has
the following testable implication.
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus, as IT adoption increases in country c, new mergers
occur in harder-to-monitor industries.
This result relates to the extensive margin of the organizational choice. It states that as
a country increases its level of IT adoption, if new industries start having mergers, these
industries have higher monitoring costs (and lower routine intensity indexes) than the old
industries which already experienced mergers.
Finally, our micro-foundation for the rents paid R(s, c,X ; i) delivers our main result.
There is a negative complementarity between the routine intensity index s and the IT
adoption index i. That is, industries that are harder-to-monitor (i.e. with a lower routine
intensity index) experiment relatively larger gains from IT adoption. The intuition is that,
in harder-to-monitor industries, there are more tasks that need to be monitored. Hence, an
improvement in the monitoring technology is more beneﬁcial in these industries. Formally,
this is captured in the negative ‘cross partial’ between s and i in (2).
While our theoretical framework presents, in our view, a compelling reason for this
complementarity to exist, this is ultimately an empirical question. The following result
presents the main testable prediction of our model.
Proposition 3. Ceteris paribus, Southern countries with better IT infrastructure (higher
i) receive relatively more M&As in harder-to-monitor (less routine-intensive) industries.
This result embeds the complementarity between the routine intensity of an industry
and the IT revolution. Proposition 3 informs us on how the relative number of mergers
varies across industries and countries with the IT revolution. The result states that the
increase in the number of mergers is relatively higher in industries with more monitoring
problems (i.e. those with a lower routine intensity index). The intuition comes from the
complementarity between monitoring tasks and the IT revolution: industries with more
monitoring problems beneﬁt relatively more from the IT revolution. Finally, note that this
result is independent of any other organizational form, as it compares the relative number
of M&As across industries and countries.
III. Data description
In order to test the empirical predictions of the model we need data on (i) North–South
vertical M&As, (ii) routine intensity measures at the industry level and (iii) IT adoption.
We obtain data on mergers and acquisitions from SDCThomson Platinum.This the most
comprehensive data set on mergers and acquisitions publicly available. For each merger,
we know the country and 4-digit SIC codes of both the acquirer and the target, the share
20
In what follows, we abuse notation and denote ic by i when there is no risk of confusion.
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TABLE 2
Highest and lowest routine-intensive occupations
Lowest RTI Highest RTI
RTI Number Description RTI Number Description
−1.39 813 Parking lot attendants 6.34 313 Secretaries and stenographers
−1.38 417 Fireﬁghting, prevention and inspection 6.32 383 Bank tellers
−1.35 808 Bus drivers 6.28 96 Pharmacists
−1.25 809 Taxi cab drivers and chauffeurs 6.27 338 Payroll and timekeeping clerks
−1.20 463 Public transportation attendants 6.22 773 Motion pictures projectionists
Note: Sample occupations that are aggregated to construct the industry routine intensity index.
Source: Autor and Dorn (2009).
TABLE 3
Data on routine-intensive intensity by industry
RTI NAICS Description
1.51 315 Apparel
1.52 321 Wood products
1.64 314 Textile product mills
1.74 312 Beverage and tobacco products
1.78 313 Textile mills
1.80 316 Leather and allied products
1.84 322 Paper
1.85 327 Non-metallic mineral products
1.86 337 Furniture and related products
1.90 331 Primary metals
1.93 324 Petroleum and coal products
2.04 326 Plastics and rubber products
2.13 336 Transportation equipment
2.17 335 Electrical equipment
2.22 311 Food
2.23 334 Computer and electronic products
2.24 339 Miscellaneous
2.25 325 Chemicals
2.32 323 Printing and related support activities
2.33 332 Fabricated metal products
2.40 333 Machinery
Note: Source: Routine intensity index at industry-level cal-
culated from the Autor and Dorn (2009)’s RTI values at
occupation level.
We are not the ﬁrst to use a routine index. In the international trade literature, Blinder
(2006), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Basco and Mestieri (2013), among
others, argue that routine intensity is a common characteristic of jobs that have become
offshorable after the IT revolution. We use our routine index as a proxy for monitoring
problems. The assumption is that the more routine a task is, the more standardized the
production process is and, thus, the less monitoring is needed. Ideally, we would like to
have this routine measure for all countries. Since we do not have this information, we make
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the plausible assumption that the ranking of routine intensity in the United States is the
same in all the countries in the sample.
As an alternative measure of monitoring problems at the industry level, we use adoption
of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems. ERP systems allow managers to better
monitor their supply chain by having access to relevant information of the production
process, including production, inventory and ﬁnance. Thus, we assume that industries with
higher adoption of ERP systems have less monitoring problems. We construct our measure
of ERP adoption at industry level from the ﬁrm level data of Bloom et al. (2014), who
give a score between 0 and 1 to each ﬁrm as a function of their level of ERP adoption.26
The industries with the highest ERP adoption are petroleum and coal products (0.56) and
chemicals (0.54).The industries with the lowest ERP adoption are apparel (0.23) and textile
product miles (0.25). The mean ERP adoption is 0.43 and the standard deviation is 0.09.
The correlation between ERP adoption and routine intensity is 0.57. This suggests that
ERP adoption has happened in routine-intensive industries, where tasks tend to be more
codiﬁable and, presumably, easier to monitor by computer software.
Our baseline IT adoption measure is Internet users per hundred people from the WDI
(World Bank).This measure has the advantage that it is the most extensive Internet adoption
variable. We think of this measure as being a proxy for the IT infrastructure in place. To
maximize the number of observations, our preferred measure is Internet users in 2000. In
our sample, the mean number of Internet users (per 100 people) is 3.92 and the standard
deviation is 6.73. The values of this variable for the top-5 host countries are Brazil (2.87),
India (0.54), China (1.78), Mexico (5.16) and Poland (7.28). As a reference, this number
is 43.1 in the US. We show in Appendix A that we obtain the same qualitative results
using earlier dates (even though the number of countries for which we have data decreases
substantially). Internet users goes from virtually zero for all countries in year 1990 to year
2000. However, there are missing observations for many countries prior to 1995.
Finally, as an alternative measure of IT adoption, we use Internet penetration rates from
Comin and Mestieri (2010). The penetration rate is a measure of the diffusion curve of
Internet in a given country relative to the US. This measure essentially captures the number
of adopters after controlling for country size and income per capita using a structural model
of technology adoption. If a country has the same penetration rate as the US, this measure
would be one, while if it were less than the US, it would be between zero and one.The lowest
penetration rate in our sample is Guinea, with 3% of the US, while the US is the highest
adopter. The average penetration rate in our sample is 29% and the standard deviation
is 11%. One drawback of this measure is that we only have data for around 40% of the
countries in our sample.
IV. Empirical analysis
In this section, we test the main result of the paper, Proposition 3. Section V performs
additional robustness checks.27
26
To do the crosswalk from SIC to NAICS we use employment weights according to the U.S. Census Bureau when
the matching is not one-to-one.
27
The working paper version (Basco and Mestieri, 2016, available from the authors’web pages) contains additional
empirical tests. We show that, in line with Proposition 1, M&As are increasing in the routine intensity of the industry
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TABLE 4
Top-5 North–South vertical M&As
Year: 1990 Year: 2000
RTI NAICS Deﬁntion RTI NAICS Deﬁnition
1.85 327 Non-metallic minerals 2.25 325 Chemicals
1.52 321 Wood products 1.90 331 Primary metals
2.23 334 Computer and electronics 2.23 334 Computer and electronics
1.93 324 Petroleum and coal 2.22 311 Food
2.22 311 Food 2.04 326 Plastics and rubber
Proposition 3 states that the effect of the IT revolution on the number of M&As is
higher in industries with high monitoring costs (low routine intensity). We test this result
by investigating the sign of the interaction between Internet adoption and the routine
intensity of the industry in the following regression:
E(M&Asc) = exp( · ITc ·RTIs +  ·Xsc +  ·Xs ·Xc + 	s + 	c), (6)
where M&Asc is the number of vertical M&As from the North to Southern country c in
industry s between 1990 and 2000, ITc is IT adoption in country c,RTIs is routine intensity of
industry s, Xs,Xc,Xsc are industry, country and industry-country varying control variables
and 	s and 	c are industry and country ﬁxed effects. Proposition 3 implies that  < 0. We
have data for the 21 3-digit NAICS industries and 60 Southern countries.28 We pool the
data by country and industry. We do not exploit the time variation because we lack enough
observations to do a regression analysis at the country-industry-year level.
Table 5 reports the coefﬁcients of running equation (6) using a negative binomial
regression.29 Column (1) reports our baseline regression. The coefﬁcient is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant.30 It means that the effect of IT adoption on the number of mergers
a country receives is decreasing with the routine intensity of the industry. A country with
better IT receives relatively more mergers in low routine-intensive industries.
within each country. We also show that, in line with Proposition 2, the routine intensity of new industries experiencing
mergers within a country declines with the diffusion of IT (Table 4).
28
The list of Southern countries receiving, at least, one vertical merger and acquisition from the North in our
dataset is:Algeria,Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands Antilles,
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
29
We prefer a Negative Binomial regression to a Poisson regression as our baseline speciﬁcation in all of our count
regressions. The reason is that a Negative Binomial regression does not impose that the mean and the variance of the
process coincide – which we would be imposing by ﬁtting a Poisson. Indeed, the Poisson regression is subsumed as a
particular case of the Negative Binomial regression. We note that if we estimate Poisson regressions as our baseline
speciﬁcation, we obtain similar and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients as well. The Poisson regression has the advantage that
it avoids the ‘incidental parameters problem’ when using ﬁxed effects and yields consistent estimators. This is
not guaranteed with the negative binomial regression. However, we follow the procedure described in Allison and
Waterman (2002) of estimating an unconditional negative binomial regression with dummy variables, which they
ﬁnd to not generate the ‘incidental parameters problem’ in their simulations. Finally, we have also veriﬁed that our
results hold when running linear regressions with ﬁxed effects instead of count regressions.
30
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The coefﬁcient is also quantitatively important. If Internet users in a country raise from
the 25th to the 75th percentile of the Internet distribution, the increase in the number
of mergers in the industry belonging to the 25th percentile of the RTI distribution (non-
metallic products) would be 29% higher than the industry in the 75th percentile (computer
and electronics).31
Standard trade theory predicts that countries export goods that intensively use the factor
in which the country is relatively abundant. Therefore, to the extent that part of this trade
is done through afﬁliates that have been acquired, we should control for these Heckscher–
Ohlin effects. Column (6) includes the capital and human capital interactions of Romalis
(2004). These are interactions between country’s factor endowments and industry factor
requirements. We also include a domestic credit interaction (interaction between ﬁnancial
development and R&D-intensity of the industry). We include this interaction because the
trade literature has also emphasized the importance of ﬁnancial development as a source
of comparative advantage.32 Note that the coefﬁcient of interest remains negative and
signiﬁcant. The rest of the variables are not statistically signiﬁcant.
A ﬁrst concern is that we do not control for openness to trade of the country. That is, if a
country does not export in a given industry (maybe because there is no production or trade
costs are very high) is not very likely that a Northern country would acquire a company.
Columns (2) and (7) include exports of each Southern country to the North at industry
level, with and without Heckscher–Ohlin effects, respectively. Note that the coefﬁcient
of interest remains negative and signiﬁcant. Moreover, as anticipated, the coefﬁcient on
exports is positive and signiﬁcant. Industries that export to the North are more likely to
receive vertical mergers.
Similarly, the existence of intraﬁrm trade in an industry may affect the choice of North-
ern headquarters. Columns (3) and (8) repeat the same regressions with related-party ex-
ports to the United States instead of total exports. We would like to have related-party
exports to the world disaggregated at the industry level, but we do not have access to these
data. The assumption is that the ranking of industries with more intraﬁrm trade in each
Southern country would be the same as in the US. Note that the coefﬁcient of interest
remains negative in both columns. The coefﬁcient on both related-party exports is positive.
Finally, columns (4) and (9) includes the share of related-party exports to the United States
(over total exports to the United States) by industry as control variable. The coefﬁcient
of interest remains negative and signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient of the share of related-party
exports is positive in both columns. It implies that countries are more likely to receive
vertical mergers in industries with more intraﬁrm trade.
A related concern is that we should also consider capital inﬂows, in addition to exports.
Unfortunately, the available disaggregated data are scarce. Columns (5) and (10) include
31
Note that the prediction of our model is on the number of M&As and not directly on intraﬁrm trade. Recently,
Ramondo et al. (2012) have documented that less than 30 percent of afﬁliate sales are shipped within the ﬁrm for
US multinationals. Our theoretical framework focuses on the organizational form and abstracts from the volume of
intraﬁrm trade. Thus, our theoretical framework is silent on this dimension (as is our empirical setup, because we do
not have the necessary data to explore this question).
32
See, for example, Antra`s and Caballero (2009), Basco (2012), Carluccio and Fally (2012), Kletzer and Bardhan
(1987) and Manova (2013). Basco (2012) considers the same interaction. All control variables are for year 2000,
except for the ones obtained from Hall and Jones (1999), which are for 1988. The assumption is that the ranking
(either across countries or industries) remains stable during the sample period.
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capital outﬂows from United States to each Southern country and industry. Notice that
the number of observations falls considerably. Thus, these results should be taken with
a grain of salt. Nonetheless, the coefﬁcient of interest remains negative and signiﬁcant.
The coefﬁcient of exports also remains positive. The coefﬁcient on capital inﬂows is neg-
ative in column (5) and not signiﬁcant when we add the Heckscher–Ohlin terms (column
10).
This section has shown that the effect of IT Adoption on the number of vertical mergers
is decreasing with the routine intensity of the industry. We have used the interaction between
IT adoption and the RTI index to test this prediction. Table A1 in Appendix A shows that
the results are robust to consider a dummy variable, High RTIs, equal to one if the RTI of
industry s is above the median (or mean), instead of the routine intensity index.
V. Robustness checks
This section performs several alternative robustness checks on the main empirical predic-
tion.
Alternative measure of monitoring problems. Our interpretation of the results is that
IT adoption has allowed headquarters to better monitor suppliers. We use routine intensity
as a proxy of monitoring problems because it is, arguably, an exogenous characteristic of
the tasks required in an industry. However, one could argue that routine intensity may proxy
for other industry characteristics. In order to address this concern, we use the adoption of
ERP systems from Bloom et al. (2014) as an alternative measure of monitoring problems.
As discussed in section III, monitoring is more efﬁcient in industries with a higher usage of
ERP systems. Columns (1) to (10) in Table 6 repeat all our baseline regressions using ERP
adoption. In all speciﬁcations, the interaction between adoption of ERP and IT is negative
and signiﬁcant.
Alternative measure of IT adoption. Next, we conduct robustness analysis on our
measure of IT adoption. A possible concern is that Internet users is not a good proxy for
IT adoption. To address this concern, we take the penetration rates estimated in Comin
and Mestieri (2010) as an alternative proxy for IT adoption (see description in section
III). Table 7 reports all baseline regressions using the penetration rate as a measure of IT
adoption. The interaction between IT adoption and routine intensity remains negative and
signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
Output. One concern is that monitoring may be easier in richer Southern countries
(as suggested in, for example, Head and Ries, 2008) and, thus, they tend to have mergers
in less routine-intensive industries. To address this concern, column (1) of Table 8 adds
the interaction of production and routine intensity to our baseline regression. Note that
the interaction between IT adoption and routine intensity remains negative and signiﬁcant.
However, the interaction with production is not signiﬁcant.
Productivity. Similarly, it could be argued that more technologically advanced coun-
tries tend to receive mergers in industries with some other characteristics that are correlated
with our measure of monitoring costs. We use total factor productivity (TFP) as an indi-
rect measure of the technological level of a country. Column (2) of Table 8 includes the
interaction between technology and routine intensity. The coefﬁcient of interest remains













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Institutions. Following the theoretical work of Antra`s (2003), a growing empirical
literature, which includes Bernard et al. (2010), Nunn (2007) and Nunn and Treﬂer (2013),
has attempted to test the role of contracting institutions in intraﬁrm trade. Moreover, La
Porta et al. (1998) and Rossi and Volpin (2004) among others emphasize the importance
of property rights institutions on mergers activity and concentration of ownership. Thus, it
could be argued that our measure of IT adoption is a proxy for other institutions. In order
to address these concerns, column (3) adds the interaction between rule of law and RTI
to the baseline speciﬁcation. Analogously, column (4) includes the interaction between
constraints on the executive and RTI. Following the terminology used in Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005), column (3) controls for contracting institutions and column (4) controls
for property rights institutions. Note that in both columns the coefﬁcient of interest remains
negative and signiﬁcant. Moreover, the interactions with contracting and property rights
institutions are not statistically different from zero.
Skill-intensity and technology adoption. An indirect effect of the adoption of IT
technologies that we do not take into account is that it complements skills (see, for example,
Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003). Therefore, it could be that the effect of IT on the number
of mergers is a function of the skill intensity of the industry, instead of the routine intensity.
In other words, our measure of routine intensity may be a proxy of the skill-intensity of
industry. Column (5) of Table 8 includes the interaction between skill-intensity of the
industry and Internet Adoption. Note that the coefﬁcient of interest remains negative and
statistically signiﬁcant. In addition, the coefﬁcient of the interaction with skill-intensity is
not signiﬁcant. We also run the same regression with only this latter interaction and the
coefﬁcient remains not signiﬁcant.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provided a ﬁrst attempt to empirically study how the IT revolution has changed
the organization of global supply chains. We focused on international mergers and acqui-
sitions, which are a growing and important fraction of FDI.
The premise of our analysis was that adoption of IT has reduced the costs of monitoring
production. We presented a simple model that showed that this implies that the effect of IT
adoption on the number of mergers is relatively larger in hard-to-monitor industries
We tested this prediction using North–South vertical mergers and acquisitions. Con-
sistent with the prediction of the model, we showed that the effect of IT adoption on the
number of M&As is decreasing with the routine intensity of the industry. This ﬁnding is
robust to alternative speciﬁcations and alternative measures of monitoring problems and
IT adoption. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we have found that an increase from the 25th
to the 75th percentile in IT adoption implies that low routine-intensive industries (e.g.
non-metallic products) would increase the number of mergers a 29% more relative to high
routine-intensive industries (e.g. computer and electronics).
To conclude, our results hint to the importance of technology adoption for the orga-
nization of the ﬁrm and international trade. We plan on further pursuing the study of the
interdependence between technology adoption and trade.
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TABLE 8
Empirical analysis of Proposition 3, output, technology, institutions and skills
Output Technology Institutions Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable: Number M&As
ITc*RTIs −0.112 −0.115 −0.125 −0.114 −0.107











Exportssc 1.06 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.06
(0.218) (0.223) (0.252) (0.241) (0.215)
K-abund.c*K-Int.s −0.121 −0.117 −0.128 −0.122 −0.124
(0.067) (0.023) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062)
H-abund.c*H-Int.s −4.73 −4.12 −5.08 −4.63 −3.82
(5.30) (5.36) (5.33) (5.41) (4.86)
Fin. Dev.c*R&D-Int.s 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.038 0.032
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
Country ﬁxed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Industry ﬁxed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 230 230 229 228 230
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of vertical M&As between 1990–2000 from the
North by southern country and industry. Data on mergers and acquisitions are obtained from SDC
Thomson Platinum. Exportssc are imports from country c to the North in industry s in 2000, from
the Feenstra database. Related-party exportssc and share related-partysc are related party exports
and share of related party exports from country c to the US. in industry s in 2002 (the oldest year
available) and obtained from U.S. Census. FDI is capital outﬂows from US to country c in industry
s in year 2000 from BEA. Human capital abundance and capital abundance data is obtained from
Hall and Jones (1999). Fin. Devc is domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) from WDI (World
Bank). R&D-intensitys is from NSF. Each speciﬁcation is a negative binomial regression. Standard
errors are clustered by country.
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AppendixA.Additional tables
Tables A1 and A2.
TABLE A1
Empirical analysis of Proposition 3, dummy variables for RTI
Above median Above average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. : Number M&A’s
ITc*High RTIs −0.033 −0.037 −0.036 −0.077 −0.028 −0.031 −0.046 −0.067
(0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014)
Exportssc 1.24 1.11 1.15 1.23 1.08 1.21
(0.398) (0.215) (0.345) (0.364) (0.220) (0.339)
FDIsc −0.064 −0.088
(0.241) (0.244)
K-abund.c*K-Int.s −0.124 −0.109 −0.127 −0.113
(0.060) (0.090) (0.061) (0.094)
H-abund.c*H-Int.s −5.80 −6.82 −5.64 −6.25
(5.73) (8.68) (5.69) (8.41)
Fin. Dev.c*R&D-Int.s 0.025 0.036 0.032 0.029
(0.034) (0.058) (0.035) (0.061)
Country ﬁxed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry ﬁxed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 381 334 230 94 381 334 230 94
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of vertical M&As between 1990–2000 from the North by southern
country and industry. In columns 1–4 High RTIs is a dummy variable equal to one if the RTI index of the industry is
above the median. Analogously, for columns 5–8 High RTIs is a dummy for when the RTI of the industry is above
the average. Data on mergers and acquisitions are obtained from SDC Thomson Platinum. Exportssc are imports
from country c to the North in industry s in 2000, from the Feenstra database. Related-party exportssc and share
related-partysc are related party exports and share of related party exports from country c to the U.S. in industry s
in 2002 (the oldest year available) and obtained from US Census. FDI is capital outﬂows from US to country c in
industry s in year 2000 from BEA. Human capital abundance and capital abundance data is obtained from Hall and
Jones (1999). Fin. Devc is domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) from WDI (World Bank). R&D-intensitys is
from NSF. Each speciﬁcation is a negative binomial regression. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Appendix B. Detailed analysis of the model in section II and proofs
We start this section by studying the problem of the headquarters of choosing whether to
induce high or low effort. Consider an input in industry s, country c and organizational
mode X .
In case the headquarters decide to induce high effort in the production of a given task,
the incentive compatibility constraint,
PHwH − ePLwH − e(c,X ), (B.1)
and the participation constraint,
(B.2)PH wH  e,
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TABLE A2
Empirical analysis of Proposition 3, different years of internet adoption
Internet 1995 Internet 1993
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. : Number M&A’s
ITc*RTIs −0.829 −0.843 −0.822 −1.95 −2.24 −2.24 −1.63 −4.37
(0.210) (0.221) (0.318) (0.527) (0.924) (0.865) (0.722) (1.19)
Exportssc 0.870 0.990 1.13 0.880 0.996 1.11
(0.198) (0.225) (0.364) (0.207) (0.235) (0.392)
FDIsc −0.093 −0.081
(0.257) (0.248)
K-abund.c*K-Int.s −0.097 −0.094 −0.096 −0.099
(0.057) (0.095) (0.060) (0.095)
H-abund.c*H-Int.s −3.72 −3.68 −4.54 −4.90
(5.60) (7.84) (6.19) (8.64)
Fin. Dev.c*R&D-Int.s 0.019 0.009 0.022 0.011
(0.038) (0.072) (0.039) (0.073)
Country ﬁxed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry ﬁxed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 335 305 222 94 280 259 183 83
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of vertical M&As between 1990–2000 from the North by southern
country and industry. In columns 1–4, ITc is Internet Adoption in 1995. Analogously, for columns ITc is Internet
Adoption in 1993. Data on mergers and acquisitions are obtained from SDC Thomson Platinum. Exportssc are imports
from country c to the North in industry s in 2000, from the Feenstra database. Related-party exportssc and share related-
partysc are related party exports and share of related party exports from country c to the U.S. in industry s in 2002
(the oldest year available) and obtained from US Census. FDI is capital outﬂows from US to country c in industry s in
year 2000 from BEA. Human capital abundance and capital abundance data is obtained from Hall and Jones (1999).
Fin. Devc is domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) from WDI (World Bank). R&D-intensitys is from NSF. Each
speciﬁcation is a negative binomial regression. Standard errors are clustered by country.
need to be satisﬁed (following the main text we are normalizing the outside option of an
agent to zero). Thus, in this case the wage offered has to satisfy simultaneously equations




1 − (c,X )





Note that, if the incentive compatibility constraint is binding when inducing high effort, it
has to be the case that
1 − 




This is ensured if the monitoring technology  is sufﬁciently imperfect, or if the penalty
imposed  in case of shirking is not arbitrarily large. In what follows we assume that
 < PL/PH , which ensures that the incentive compatibility constraint is always binding
when inducing high effort.
Assumption 2. The monitoring technology, , is sufﬁciently imperfect and the penalty






If the headquarters decide to induce low effort, they just pay agents their outside option
to satisfy the participation constraint, which we have normalized to zero.
We can analyze now whether it is more proﬁtable to induce high or low effort for the
headquarters. This boils down to comparing the expected output of a task for a worker that
exerts high or low effort in a given task. Headquarters choose to induce high effort if and
only if the expected output minus the payment to a worker is higher. That is, if
PHa(j)1 − e(c)1 − (c,X )
PH − PL PLa(j)1, (B.5)
where the 1 stands for the unit of labor provided by a worker. Let a denote the lowest
productivity in the support of possible productivities of a ﬁrm. Then, a sufﬁcient condition
for headquarters to always want to implement high effort is
(PH − PL)2a  max
c∈C
e(c). (B.6)
We assume that the difference in probabilities is large enough so that condition (B.6) holds.
Thus, inducing high effort is always optimal.






Thus, the payment offered for a discretional task t under organizational choice X in
country c is
w(t, c,X ) = 1 − (c,X )
PH − PL e(c). (B.8)
The payment to a standardized task is the outside option because of the perfect observability
assumption. The total payment to a worker in a industry in which there are s standardized
tasks is the sum of the payments for all discretional tasks,
(T − s)1 − (c,X )
PH − PL e(c). (B.9)
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider two industries s and s′ such that s < s′ for which
we observe some mergers in country c. The ceteris paribus assumption implies that the
cost of the marginal input being offshored is the same (s) = (s′) and that the measure
of offshored inputs is the same, Ns = Ns′ . We show the result by contradiction. Suppose
that the number of mergers in industry s, Ms, is greater than in industry s′, Ms′ . That is
Ms > Ms′ . Note that the marginal merger in industry s is in country c (amongst possibly
other countries). This means that




Note that we have that R(s′, c,M ) < R(s, c,M ) and that, by assumption, (s) = (s′).
This implies that a(s′, c,M ) < a(s, c,M ), which implies that 1 − F(a(s′, c,M )) > 1 −
F(a(s, c,M )), i.e. Ms < Ms′ . A contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us denote by i = 0 the level of Internet adoption before the
IT revolution. Consider a level of IT adoption i > 0 in country c. Consider two industries
s, s′ with s′ > s. Thus, R(s, c,X ; i) > R(s′, c,X ; i). Suppose that at i = 0 neither industry
experienced mergers. We show by contradiction that it is not possible that there are mergers
at i in industry s but not in s′. The ceteris paribus assumption implies that the maximal cost
of production and that the total number of inputs to be offshored are equal, (s) = (s′)
and Ns = Ns′ . Suppose that there are mergers in industry s and not in s′. Let a˜(s, c,M )
denote the least productive acquired ﬁrm in industry s. This implies that the marginal cost
of production is
R(s, c,M ; i)
a˜(s, c,M )
= (s). (B.11)
Note that in this model, if mergers are preferred in one sector in one country, then mergers
are preferred to arm’s length contracting in all sectors in this country.
This implies that
R(s′, c,M ; i)
a˜(s, c,M )
< (s′), (B.12)
a contradiction, because it would be possible to produce at lower cost than what is being
done in equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider ﬁrst the case in which no O-organization is ever
operating in country c. Suppose further that only country c receives mergers. In this case,
the number of mergers remains constant, as the total number of inputs is ﬁxed to Ns.
Suppose now that there are only mergers in c but that another country c′ is also supplying
inputs. Suppose we want to compare two sectors s and s′. The ceteris paribus assumption
implies that the maximal cost of production and that the total number of inputs to be
offshored are equal, (s) = (s′) and Ns = Ns′ In fact, the maximal cost of production
¯(s) remains constant because it is pinned downed by c′. The ceteris paribus assumption
ensures that ¯(s) is constant around s. We have that the number of ﬁrms operating is
1 − F(a(s, c,M ; i)) = 1 − F(¯(s)wcR(s, c,M ; i)). Taking the ‘derivative’of this expression
with respect to s and i yields33
−f ′(¯(s)wcR(s, c,M ; i))¯(s)2RiRs − f (¯(s)wcR(s, c,M ; i))Rsi <0, (B.13)
where f ′(·) denotes the ﬁrst derivative of the density function and Rx denotes the partial
derivative of R with respect to x. As f ′ < 0, Rs < 0, Ri < 0 and Rsi > 0 (see equation 2),
the result follows.
Consider now the case in which there are both O- and M -organizations for some s and
s′. In this case, we have that the ratio R(s, c,M ; i)/R(s, c,O; i) is independent of s. Hence
the ‘cross partial’ is zero.
33
To be more precise, the derivative expression with respect to s has to be understood as a ﬁrst difference, as s∈N.
25
Finally, note that the intermediate case of starting with no O-organization before the
Internet revolution and incorporating O-activity during the Internet revolution is a combi-
nation of the two previous cases. Hence, by dividing the problem in two sub-periods, one
where there is no O-activity and another where there is at least one O-organization, the
result follows. 
Final Manuscript Received: November 2016
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